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Managing Black Guys:
Representation, Corporate Culture, and the NBA
Glyn Hughes
This article explores the intersection of representation, management, and race in the National Basketball Association (NBA) through a larger question on the relationship between
corporate strategies for managing racialized subjects and popular representations of race.
The NBA “brand”is situated in terms of recent developments in corporate and popular culture and then analyzed as an example of diversity management. Relying on original interviews with NBA corporate employees, as well as business and marketing industry reporting, the article analyzes the NBA as simultaneously an organization and a brand. As such,
the NBA helps to “articulate” the corporate with the popular, largely through an implied
racial project that manages race relations by continuing to equate corporate interests with
Whiteness. The analysis contributes to ongoing discussions about the role of sports in perpetuating social disparities based on race at a time when “colorblindness” remains the paradigm of White approaches to race.
Cet article explore l’intersection de la représentation, la gestion et la race dans la ligue
nationale de basket-ball (NBA) par le biais d’une question plus large qui porte sur les relations entre les stratégies des corporations pour gérer des sujets « racialisés » et les
représentations populaires de la race. La marque NBA est située en termes de développements
récents dans la culture populaire et corporative, puis analysée comme exemple de « gestion
de la diversité ». À partir d’entrevues avec des employés de la NBA et des rapports sur le
commerce et le marketing industriel, cet article analyse la NBA simultanément comme
organisation et comme marque. La NBA aide à imbriquer le corporatif et le populaire via un
projet racial qui gère les relations raciales en continuant à associer intérêts corporatifs et
« blancheur ». L’analyse contribue aux débats sur le rôle du sport dans la perpétuation des
disparités sociales fondées sur la race au moment où l’absence de considération de la couleur
demeure l’approche (blanche) privilégiée par rapport à la race.

This article explores the intersection of representation, management, and
race in the National Basketball Association (NBA). In their survey of research on
sports and race, Davis and Harris assert that “The association between athletics
and African American success is not surprising, given that sports is just about the
only type of mainstream (nonfictional) media coverage in which one can see images of many successful African Americans” (1998, p. 166). Certainly, anyone
who has followed the NBA over the past 25 years knows that the league has confronted various and complicated issues having to do with race. The recent upsurge
of international players notwithstanding, the NBA remains a primary circulator of
The author <ghughes@Richmond.edu> is a doctoral candidate at the University of
California at Santa Barbara and a visiting Instructor at the University of Richmond .
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images of African American men for mass audiences. And it almost goes without
saying that to speak of race and the NBA is to invoke, through to our current
cultural moment, a deeply troublesome U.S. history of the figure of the Black
male.
Black men in the public sphere are typically afforded a limited and limiting
representational framework traceable to the historical politics of the White imaginary that manages race through a choreography of proximity and distance to White
norms and expectations. Good Blacks are welcomed into the center of American
cultural life, bad Blacks are condemned, and, at the same time, proximate Blacks
are always haunted by the condemned because they are defined by what they are
not. In fact, at the moment of this writing in the fall of 2003, yet another of the
NBA’s young Black stars is embodying that figure on TV, his hypermarketed smile
and extraordinary play now overshadowed by serious, media-frenzied accusations
of sexual assault. It is less important who this player is than that his scenario is so
familiar. This is because, given all of the other possible cultural frameworks that
might provide less restrictive stagings, the sociological nuances of their recurrence, appeal, and effects continue to warrant scrutiny.
In particular, the prominence of Black players in U.S. sport is not unrelated
to the fact that so many White people in the U.S. continue to experience race in
rather stark Black-and-White terms; and that White experience is not unrelated to
the fact that Black men, as a group, remain incredibly overrepresented in the criminal
justice system.1 Furthermore, since the NBA is a widely marketed and recognized
league brand, and since the players in the NBA are more likely to be Black than in
any other league, the analysis here might also be described as an investigation of
the NBA’s position in relation to the fact that the Black male remains the most
problematic racial subject in the White imaginary.2
Although it might be tempting to think that the NBA’s success in the U.S.
has been achieved despite the recurrent scandals of misbehaving Black men, today’s
NBA has, at its core, a strategy for managing player behavior, as well as people’s
perceptions of those efforts. The NBA’s success cannot, in fact, be separated from
those representations. When current NBA Commissioner and CEO David Stern
took over in 1984, the league’s image was in trouble. In his words, “sponsors were
flocking out of the NBA because it was perceived as a bunch of high-salaried,
drug-sniffing Black guys” (quoted in Maharaj, 1999, p. 231). Tracing this business
sentiment through to the present, we can see the NBA’s current success—its profitability and its visibility—as a marketing victory that has pivoted on a highly
strategized and racialized image. Whereas NBA spokespersons claim that what
keeps the NBA brand vibrant is the amazing athletic ability of the players who, for
the most part, really are great guys, it is nonetheless true that the NBA is marketed
and managed with a specific, if often tacit, goal of making Black men safe for
(White) consumers in the interest of profit. As such, the story of race in the NBA is
also a less visibly troubled story of Whiteness—White anxiety and fear and White
strategies for threat management.
Generally speaking, marketers like to think about their brands as sets of
perceptions that exist in the minds of consumers. This marketing understanding of
brands is incomplete, however. Because brands are also perceptions in the minds
of everyone with a relationship to them, limiting our understanding of brands to
consumer perceptions obscures the nuanced and influential manifestations of brands
occurring elsewhere—in sites of production, in the minds of producers, across the
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field of competing brands, and, if they are prominent enough, throughout the vast
scope of what we might call the business-marketing imaginary. Marketers know
that brand perceptions translate into actions and practices related to the brand, and,
by sociological extension, we can assume that everywhere there are brand perceptions there will also be some set of practices informed by those perceptions.
In particular, since branding is the management of consumer perceptions,
production-side brand perceptions are an important focal point—one typically not
made explicit by practitioners or critical scholars—for examining the relationship
between the corporate inside and outside, as well as between the identities and
subjectivities that populate that terrain. Indeed, this project’s major contribution is
to critical discussions of race, representation, sport, and corporate interests. But
rather than reading corporate interests off of representations, this project moves
from the inside out in an effort to provide a textured sense of how actual corporate
subjects and logics have come to inform the representation of Black male basketball players.
This project is, theoretically, an attempt to map concrete developments of
corporate interests in the form of managerial trends as they traverse and bring
together the spheres of corporate and popular culture. The specific example of the
NBA also illustrates the role of race in the constitution of those trajectories. The
fact that the corporate is bound up with the popular, and even that it establishes
some of its ideological limits, is not so surprising, although I think the specific
terms of their relation are. Whereas corporate interests obviously exert some determining force over both the structure and content of popular culture, to paraphrase Stuart Hall (1996), there is no necessary correspondence between them, no
guarantees in any particular instance for how they are brought together, articulated, and to what effect. A primary reason for an articulation’s uncertain
determinacy can be explained by the double meaning of the term. It is at once a
kind of linkage among elements, with no inherent or necessary relation to one
another, and it is a type of linkage created by human practices of meaning making,
by the production of social discourse (Grossberg, 1996, p. 141). Such a theory of
articulation offers both a way of grasping “how ideological elements come, under
certain conditions, to cohere together in a discourse, and a way of asking how they
do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects” (Grossberg, pp. 141-142).
Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation is complemented by Michael Omi and
Howard Winant’s theory of racial formations, which asserts that truths about race
become socially dominant when they form links between social structures and
policies, on the one hand, and patterns of representation on the other. Such formations are political in that they arise out of struggles among competing racial projects
over how race should properly be understood. The NBA is a participant in one
such racial project because it constitutes “an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics” that is inseparable from a particular social structure
of race that distributes resources accordingly (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 56). The
NBA is but one prominent site for exploring the relation between corporate and
popular culture, one in which a particular racial project combines with a constellation of corporate–managerial–marketing projects to articulate a new variation on
the relationship between racialized representations and social structures.
In order to expose and examine the NBA’s popular corporate conjunctures,
my research methodology focuses on production-side understandings of and
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practices related to the brand. The term production side refers to the strategy behind the NBA’s brand positioning and the corporate culture that facilitates it, as
well as to perceptions of what the NBA means in the broader corporate field. Thus,
in the fall of 2000 and winter of 2001, I conducted audio-recorded, open-ended,
conversational, on-site interviews with ten NBA corporate employees. The interviews were arranged by a junior-level marketer and were limited to two short
research trips. Although the resulting sample did not extend into the highest executive levels, interviewees ranged in rank from interns to managers to divisional
directors, all with at least some brand-positioning responsibility. Six of the ten
participants were men. Each interview flowed from two related questions: First, I
asked interviewees to describe their working sense of the NBA brand. Second, I
asked them to talk about brand strategy in relation to various “audiences,” both
internal and external, including various NBA corporate divisions and team franchises, corporate employees and players, corporate sponsors and partners, news
media, and fans. I then organized the content of the transcribed interviews around
a central theme of how the process of branding actually occurs in the NBA; how,
that is, the NBA brand is created, managed, and experienced inside the organization.
Racialized anxieties recurred in the interviews in different ways, and, consequently, I turned my attention toward the broader corporate field, giving attention
to that issue. Specifically, I conducted database searches of management and marketing literature that discussed the meaning of the NBA within business frameworks, and, in those sources, I looked especially for evidence that could inform the
issues of race that emerged from the interviews.
This article is an organized presentation of an analysis that took shape as I
moved through the various data. After an initial discussion of the NBA’s “problem” with race, I contextualize it in terms of the recent, embedded histories of the
NBA, business and sports intersections, and recent developments in business and
corporate culture. From that discussion, I then consider the NBA as an example of
diversity management. These interrelated frameworks work as a backdrop for understanding the ways in which actual NBA marketers and business people understand and produce the NBA brand; it is this latter part of the essay that is the most
grounded in interview data.

Racial Anxiety in the NBA
In critical work on Nike ads, the documentary film Hoop Dreams, the NBA,
and iconic NBA players (for example, Magic Johnson, Charles Barkley, and Michael
Jordan) scholars have noted a recurrent set of racist dichotomies that structure the
commodified representation of Black male basketball players. In their analysis of
Hoop Dreams, for example, Cheryl Cole and Samantha King (1998) discuss the
dyad of the athlete/gang member, which constructs the dominant narrative of (athletic) Black male success against the taken-for-granted, negative environment of
the inner city. Todd Boyd (1997) has historicized the dichotomy further by linking
it to the field-slave/house-slave image. These dichotomies remain central to understanding the NBA brand. For, despite efforts by NBA brand managers to repress the gangsta by hyping the gentleman athlete, the repressed has returned again
and again, and the NBA has responded with an escalation of image-management
innovations.
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Commissioner David Stern’s business–marketing strategy was only part of
the story of the league’s rehabilitated image because his tenure coincided with the
professional career of Michael Jordan, a man whose own business savvy, basketball skills, and commodified image have accounted for well over 10 billion dollars
being pumped into the U.S. economy (Johnson, 1998b). In fact, for nearly twenty
years, the highly managed image of Michael Jordan (MJ) has been the exemplary
racialized “ other” to Stern’s “drug-sniffers”: MJ, as his agent once argued, embodies an “All American image. . . Norman Rockwell values, but with a contemporary flair” (quoted in Andrews, 1996, p. 315). And here we already have insight
into how this dichotomy works. In a rehabilitative, management move, the previously threatening specter of race was transformed into a “contemporary flair” that
MJ contributed to a rather White sense of safety evoked by “All American” and
“Norman Rockwell.” Or, as Gitanjali Maharaj (1999) describes it, the White imaginary has updated the field and the big house with the institutional and discursive
constructs of “the street” on the one hand and the athletic arena and the corporation on the other. Maharaj also notes that this dichotomous structure traces an arc
from the ghetto to the ball court, a preferred (White) path of redemption from
unproductive to productive subjectivity: a “passage from exteriority to interiority,
from the ‘street’ world of economic dependency, hyperproductivity, crime, and
drug addiction to the regulated, economically productive, patriarchal, and White
world of corporate life” (1999, p. 230).3 And, yes, NBA profits soared: “in ten
seasons under Stern’s leadership the league experienced 1600% growth in annual
revenues” (Maharaj, 1999, p. 232).4
With this representational history in mind, my initial NBA interviews and
site visits centered on how marketers were currently thinking about the racialized
terms of the brand, and what links might be made between that thinking and David
Stern’s racialized project of image improvement. My first interview was with two
White marketing researchers (September 20, 2000). When asked to describe their
sense of the brand, they said it was a set of “urban thematics,” by which they
meant that NBA basketball fits into the fabric of what it means to have fun in the
Big City, whichever NBA city that happens to be. In practice this has translated
into NBA events that bring together an effervescence of lights, celebrities, and
consumable accessories that create, for NBA fans, an experience of participating
in an idealized vision of city life that is both exciting and safe. Presuming that they
would share with me a sense that “urban” is often code for Black in today’s consumer culture, I invoked David Stern’s quote from years before. I then asked whether
these “urban thematics” had anything to do with race because, it seemed to me,
that for a lot of White people, NBA players (as mediated) constitute their primary
relationships to Black men. The following exchange ensued:
Marketer #1: “Noting race isn’t something that we really spend a whole lot
of time looking at in terms of perceptions of the league. I think also what we
do know is that, as generations pass, and you get new generations, they’re
less and less colorblind. Umm, we’re seeing that with . . .”
Marketer #2: “More and more.”
Me: “More and more or less and less?”
M1: “Less and less colorblind.”
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Me: “They see color more?”
M2: “More and more?!”
M1: [blushing] “You’re right. I’m sorry.”
M2: “You’re on tape now.” [laughs]
M1: “There’s really no conscious effort [around race] in terms of us doing
research or in marketing.”
Stumbling for the first and only time during the interview, Marketer #1’s response
is a symptom of an aspect of the NBA brand and branding that recurred throughout
my research. The symptom here signals a general anxiety in a White mindset that
makes it difficult to talk directly about race, and it gives notice to the fact that,
despite the explicit claims to the contrary, race remains both noticed and relevant.
Indeed, when I returned four months later for more interviews arranged by
Marketer #2 (from the first interview), four of my seven interviews were with
Black men. I have no idea how intentional or contrived this was, but it seemed
designed to make visible—again, without speaking to the issue directly—that NBA
corporate was indeed colorblind precisely because there are collaborating Black
men among its ranks. When I asked those interviewees what they made of their
overrepresentation in the second set of interviews, they responded with some reservation but also suggested a line of connection that was absent in other interviews. (Of course, as NBA employees, all of the people I interviewed were inclined
toward some degree of solidarity with the NBA project.) One young African
American NBA staffer simply said, “Yeah, it’s a problem that 80% of the players
are Black and only 20% of corporate is Black.”5 Far from being colorblind, all of
these men saw their jobs as more or less racially relevant. Either they saw it as
important to simply represent Black men on the corporate side of things, or they
saw the NBA as an important focal point for Black men and so they wanted to be
involved in the process, or they understood the mere fact of their own success,
irrespective of the NBA context, as a contribution to racial equality. In the words
of one senior manager,
I feel comfortable that the organization is morally correct in a lot of their
approaches to things, whether it’s fines for players who speak out in the
wrong way or whatever. My presence, alone, I think, assists in that, because
with . . . people of color in the organization who can kind of in meetings
share their opinions about athletes and positioning, I think it helps. (January
24, 2001)
Each of the two previous quotes makes important, interrelated points that
were completely evaded by the White marketing researchers in the first interview.
For all of the Black NBA employees I interviewed, race was an important part of
their own NBA consciousness and experience, and their explanations of its relevance consistently established links to the more visible racial politics of the league
itself. Despite this divergence over the relevance of race for recognizing connections between the public image of the league and the corporate side of the NBA,
however, White and Black employees seemed to agree that abstract “social” forces
led to the NBA being unfairly singled out for scrutiny.
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According to these NBA employees, whatever problems the NBA faced in
terms of race, they were best understood in terms of forces that were outside of the
league’s control. For example, although remarking that he felt “weird” and “uncomfortable” talking about race, a White senior media and marketing manager
summarized the NBA’s relation to the social this way:
A lot of what goes on in all of our leagues is reflective of society. And that’s
something we’ve said for quite some time. . . . We’re an easy target and so is
everyone else in the entertainment world. (January 25, 2001)
Similarly, the Black senior manager quoted earlier wondered,
do you think, in any organization or in any facet of society, there aren’t
people that do those types of things, you know what I mean? Because we’re
just, the players are a microcosm of society. And only the bad stuff comes to
a head.” (January 24, 2001)
With or without the patina of White anxiety, the overall assessment in the interviews was that the image trouble faced by the NBA stemmed from an externality—society—that the NBA should not be held accountable to fix. The question
still remains: How does the NBA make sense of race, particularly given its anxious
grasp of the relationship between the sphere of the NBA and the broader social
stage? In order to more thoroughly explore that anxiety—including the details of
its management and its social implications—the next section begins by situating
the NBA in terms of the more general cultural relationship between sports and
business that has developed over the same period.

Managing Race Inside and Out
White men in suits don’t have to jump.
–Public Enemy, “He Got Game,” 1998.
Over the last two to three decades, the profitable synergy between sports and
business has been reengineered. In the interest of brevity, the new sports–business
convergence centers on the notion of “flexibility.” Whereas the term’s usage is
complex and flexible itself (see Martin, 1994), it conveys a central value in the
globalized, post-Fordist business world. Corporate globalization, including new
technologies that can transmit media content, financial data, and other business
discourse around the globe instantaneously; intensified competition for global
markets; and financial uncertainty has encouraged new corporate forms and practices that have combined to make the corporation more fleet-footed, more flexible,
and more mobile in its dealings with these uncertainties. As corporations have
become more geographically dispersed, technological advances, including the development of flexible, quick-delivery forms of manufacturing, have made possible a radical shift away from labor costs as the main determinant of profit in
favor of increased emphases on marketing and design (see Appelbaum, 1996; Reich,
1991).
The result has been a “race to the bottom” for outsourced, cheap labor on the
manufacturing front coupled with a renewed corporate sensitivity to the profit
potential of “intellectual labor” and marketing in particular. Coinciding with the
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new investment in intellectual labor, the early 1980s witnessed management’s discovery of “corporate culture” (the corporate environment of patterned social relations), which became, in fact, the pivotal element in a proliferation of more flexible, antihierarchical management approaches designed to maximize productivity
in the face of changing market demands. In this managerial core, flexibility entailed emphases on teamwork and rejections of hierarchy, albeit in a larger context
of the “lean and mean” corporation. Old-school emphases on worker discipline
and the scientific management of intellectual, creative productivity were superceded by new “softer” emphases on “corporate culture,” which promoted “flexible
hours, job enrichment, self-managed work teams,” and other mechanisms intended
to get more from employees by treating them as “whole” persons, eager to perform
(Donzelot, 1991[1980], p. 251).6
It was in this general environment that companies such as Reebok and Nike
aggressively insinuated themselves, through media and sports sponsorship, into
the emergent fitness lifestyles of self-improvement associated with the
“professional–managerial class” of the 1980s (Ehrenreich, 1989). The same period also witnessed the emergence of active, upwardly mobile lifestyles and a new
ideology of sports fitness: a rhetorically empowered (and later dubbed) “Just Do
It!” culture that ushered in enterprising approaches to bodily fitness, including a
new fondness for healthy gourmet food and a literal and figurative “war on softness” (Ehrenreich, 1989, pp. 231–236). These changes in consumer culture were
driven, of course, by the business processes described earlier, and, as such, they
paralleled the duplicitous, top-down nature of the turn toward culture inside corporations. Scholars writing about this period have noted that the “empowering”
fitness regimes of the 1980s and 1990s invested the bodies and lifestyles of consumer subjects with capitalist ideals about the “worker’s body and a body of workers that are well-managed in the way a portfolio is well-managed” (Linda Singer,
quoted in Cole, 1994, p. 17). The analogy was only amplified by corporate advertising campaigns, which, across the full range of industries, sought to associate
their brands with sports as a way of competing in the cluttered new mediascape.7
Embedded in these convergent histories, the NBA should be understood as
far more than a basketball league. As a company and a brand that is centered on a
sports league in which the vast majority of its players are Black men, the NBA is
bound up, in a racialized way, with the cultural nexus of sports and business. In
this respect it is important to recognize that over the past few decades the corporate field, in general, has confronted changing workforce demographics and increased competition for diversifying global markets. Thus, in intimate conjunction
with these developments, something known as “diversity management” emerged
as a centerpiece of the new corporate cultures (Gordon, 1995, p. 3).8 According to
the American Management Association, for example, by 1997 over “half of all
U.S. employers ha[d] established some kind of formal initiative to manage cultural diversity” (Caudron & Hayes, 1997, p. 121).9 And this was the same year that
“the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission reported that 95–97% of senior managers
at Fortune 1000 companies were men and 97% were White” (Caudron & Hayes,
1997, p. 121).
Affirmative action, it seems, had proven too rigid and, ultimately, alienating
to overrepresented groups for it to be compatible with the new cultures of flexibility and teamwork, and it was too much of a drag on the instrumental goals of
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efficiency and profit. Therefore, the externally generated fact of affirmative action
and the risk of bad publicity positioned race as an external obstacle for corporate
America. In addition, whereas the social forces behind those facts also ensured
that the impediment of race was no longer avoidable, the costs of failing to seem
racially progressive had also increased. Diversity management offered a liberating
new way to think about the problem, a way of internalizing control over it that was
utterly compatible with the general turn toward management through culture. Thus,
in its embrace of difference, diversity management allowed companies to be proactive in ways that exceeded the expectations of the state; and, by publicizing their
diversity management programs both internally and externally, companies were
able to avoid social criticism by seeming to take the high moral ground.
In the diversity management project, as described by Avery Gordon, “corporate culture links a vision of racial and gender diversity to its existing relations of
ruling to produce something that might be called multicultural corporatism” (1995,
p. 3). Therefore, one way of understanding diversity management is as a movement to recuperate corporate America’s presumed right of self-governance, because, above all, managing diversity promised to put management in general back
in the driver’s seat. It might be stating the obvious, given the foregoing discussion,
that Gordon’s critical framework for understanding corporate approaches to diversity makes possible an interpretation of the NBA as a diversity management project.
There is a twist or two, however. The NBA certainly manages its most visible
racialized subjects or workers (i.e., players) in the league, but, in a curious way,
those disciplined workers are also the company’s products. The NBA, in other
words, makes its money from its ability to control the image (the representation)
of its largely Black male stars. Therefore, the crucial question for my analysis here
centers on how these two types of control are linked to one another: that is, what
are the “relations of ruling” that unite, on the one hand, the NBA’s strategy of
disciplining racialized subjects, and, on the other hand, its disciplined representations of race?
To the extent that the logic informing representations of Black male
basketballers in the NBA is consonant with the corporate logic of diversity management, it might assist in clarifying how the problematic status of those representations, as discussed in the critical sports literature, informs the relations of ruling
now occurring in U.S. corporations. The NBA is an especially rich site for thinking about new configurations of representation and governance if we refer to both
the cultural and political meanings of representation10 and, similarly, if we assume
a broad definition of governance as the relations of ruling that circumscribe “an
influential feature of the larger project, currently underway, of rewriting our nation’s
basic social contract” (Gordon, 1995, p. 3) in which social legitimacy is pursued
increasingly through a dialectic of cultural visibility and consumerist identity and
practice. It has become, therefore, increasingly important for social analysts to
map the interests and patterns of social governance operating through commercial
culture, particularly because the targets of that governance are members of historically marginalized groups.
How, then, has the NBA learned to govern, and, ultimately, what is it teaching us? Thinking ahead of his diagnosis about the drug-sniffing, overpaid Black
male image of the NBA at the beginning of his tenure, David Stern asserted his
“conviction that if everything else went right, race would not be an abiding issue
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to NBA fans, at least not as long as it was handled correctly” (Maharaj, 1999, p.
232). As I have already suggested, Stern’s conviction intimates a sort of
choreographed movement from the outside (the street) to the inside (the rule-bound
court) that also suggests the existence of a guiding hand, a certain directional force—
in a word, management. Consequently, the NBA itself—the company and also the
brand—emerges as a character in the morality play that it also stages. The NBA, in
other words, is not simply a showcase for Black celebrity athletes; it is itself a set
of conventions that, in sometimes subtle and yet always present ways, calls attention to itself as a hero in relation to an “other” that comes from outside. This NBAas-management narrative encodes a disciplinary framework around
what Stuart Allen Clarke . . . calls the “Black men misbehaving” narrative—
a narrative that simultaneously expresses, affirms, and authorizes popular
fears, pleasures, and anxieties in ways that shape the experience of race in
both personal and public spaces. (Cole & Andrews, 1996, p. 143)
Specific examples of unruliness by NBA players and their subsequent containment will help to illustrate some of the implications of these embedded frameworks.
David Stern’s plans to ensure that race would not endure as an abiding issue
for NBA fans suggested, in one respect, a kind of naïve desire for a “colorblind”
society that might have seemed possible inside the NBA of the 1980s and early
1990s, when MJ’s Norman Rockwell presence represented the league’s vision of
racial harmony. In another respect, many of the league’s players, the objects of
Stern’s (image-) management strategy, refused to abide by his vision of colorblind
harmony. An especially noteworthy and highly publicized turning point in this
saga occurred in 1997, when, as Newsweek reported, Black NBA star Latrell
Sprewell (then with the Golden State Warriors) “choked and tried to punch his
[White] coach,” P.J. Carlesimo (Starr & Samuels, 1997, p. 26). The article’s headline wondered, “Are the game’s bad boys, old-guard coaches or the hype-hungry
endorsement industry to blame?” Whatever the cause or solution, the article goes
on to suggest, the problem is player behavior, itself a theme that predated the Stern/
MJ era, and one that would be echoed for years to come across sport media.11 For
example, a more recent Sports Illustrated survey of 874 avid NBA fans showed
41% saying that player behavior was a major factor in their deciding not to attend
games (James, 2000).
According to some, Black players’ attitudes in the mid- to late-1990s underwent a generational shift toward less patience for racism in the context of accelerated commercialization. “The post-Jordan era figures to be an anxious one for the
league,” the Newsweek article explained, because of the explosive tension between
old-school team discipline and lucrative pressure from advertisers and endorsers
that “prize the street cool that moves the merchandise” (Starr & Samuels, 1997, p.
28). Sociologist Elijah Anderson explains the effect: “Older players in the league,
because of racism, know how to be more accommodating when situations aren’t to
their liking [but] this new generation has no patience for anything they think isn’t
fair. They won’t take it” (Starr & Samuels, p. 28).12 In its exploration of the problem, however, and without specifying it directly, Newsweek situated the problem
in a triad of dynamics that nicely framed the managerial dilemma faced by the
NBA: the need for discipline, the need to deal with racism, and the recognition of
the formula that Black equals cool equals revenue.13
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These conflicting challenges and opportunities faced by the NBA brought to
the surface an anxiety confronted by a wide range of corporations feeling
competitive pressure to become more diverse. A central aspect of diversity management not made explicit in the ebullient industry reporting on its benefits is that
it values certain types of racial difference. Said differently, to value diversity in a
business context necessarily means that race (and other forms of recognized difference) must be transformed from a threat to corporate hegemony into profitability. As a consequence, anxiety over the type of difference—the threat of uncooperative, unproductive subjects in the corporation itself—exists as a kind of absent
presence in diversity-management discourse. For example, evidence for racism’s
presence in corporate America is discernible in its obsession with repeating, whenever there is an opportunity, that “valuing” a managed version of diversity is profitable, that it will not “drag your company down” into the red, suggesting, of course,
an anxiety about the converse. Here is just a sampling of what I mean:
• “If diversity is to ever fully take hold in a corporate culture, its effect on the
bottom line must be proven” (Caudron & Hayes, 1997, p. 124).
• An HR Focus article, titled “Why diversity matters,” answers that “diversity
is critical to an organization’s bottom line success.” (Gardenswartz & Rowe,
1998, p. S1).
• On the topic of diversity, an Advertising Age piece informs us that “The
intangible edge is best classified under productivity, and the tangible benefit
is profit” (Kim, 1997).
• The Personnel Journal singled out Hallmark, in 1996, as an exemplary corporation: “Hallmark recognizes employee individuality, encourages work–
life balance, promotes open communication, enthuses over diversity, tosses
in a healthy dose of benefits—and makes a profit because of it” (Flynn,
1996, p. 50).
• In his HR Magazine article, “Building a rainbow one stripe at a time,” Marc
Adams (1998, pp. 72–73) assures readers that “Many employees have long
believed that a diverse workforce is the key to a well-rounded organization,
not to mention bigger profit margins.”
• In a Fortune article on “The 50 best companies for Asians, Blacks and Hispanics,” author Roy Johnson (1998a) “wondered if companies that do good
also do well by shareholders.” He concluded by claiming that “No one can
say that companies striving for—and in most cases, investing heavily in—
ethnic inclusion at every level are doing so at the expense of profits.”
Indeed, articles that argue or imply that pursuing diversity inherently cuts
into profits are rare. The persistence of a reassuring tone regarding the counterintuitive profitability of diversity, however, implicates an audience of managers
who remain anxious about diversity’s threat to the bottom line. In their repeated
promising of profits as a result, promoters of diversity management sell their new
form of governance with tacit claims that managerialism in U.S. corporations can
make racial difference profitable. Diversity management aims to make race neat
and tidy and oriented toward common corporate goals. In addition, as with
Jordanesque representations of Black men, diversity management stands in tacit
contrast to the mess of race on the street and in the ghetto, implying that the more
unruly race problems require a different sort of management, a point to which I
will return momentarily.
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If, at the beginning of the Stern era (and in ways analogous to corporate
America generally), the NBA’s challenge was to reframe race in the interest of
profitability, then, by the 1990s, race in the NBA had come to occupy an abiding,
yet ambivalent, status as both the key to corporate success and its major impediment. In other words, because many racialized product–players have refused to
placate White expectations for the sake of the league’s image, there remains in the
league/brand a racialized turbulence that continues to threaten the bottom line. It
was this recurrence that both frustrated Stern’s colorblind hopes and prompted a
new approach.
As a consequence, the NBA of the late 1990s became determined to manage
the situation by reframing its product in order to break perceived equations between the NBA and the messiness of race—the threat of the street—and instead
figuring those undesirable elements as both importations from outside and as the
object of the NBA’s rehab efforts. At the same time, it sought to showcase the more
profitable, desirable elements. In the early part of our current decade, the NBA still
appears to be committed to this strategy. In brief, the NBA has rebranded itself as
both an institution of racial uplift and an entrepreneur of racial flair, a move that, in
practice, has involved the NBA in a somewhat conflicted double role of discipliner
and promoter of the race. On the one hand, the league made clear that, as a governing body, it would not “accept or condone behavior that would not be tolerated in
any other segment of society” (David Stern as quoted in Starr & Samuels, 1997,
pp. 26, 28). On the other hand, in its rethinking of the issue—much like corporate
America’s end run around affirmative action, whereby corporate culture “discovers a new racial ethnic diversity in society by excusing itself from any responsibility” for broader social patterns of racism (Gordon, 1995, p. 16)14—the NBA envisioned the race problem as one imported from outside its own boundaries, and,
therefore, one that it could not affect so much as manage.
As I introduced in the previous section, NBA corporate subjects appear to
understand the NBA as contradictorily undifferentiated from and exceptional to
society. When it comes to bad behavior, it seems, NBA players are understood as
simply part of a larger society in which that kind of thing happens all the time. In
this construction, the NBA is affected by society because it has to deal with its
mess; at the same time there is no indication here, or in any of my interviews, that
the NBA image affects society, that the NBA is actually a producer of race. As one
marketing director phrased it, “I think we’re just looking for society to right itself. . . . But we can’t create that” (September 20, 2000). In this way the NBA
conveniently misunderstands its own agency and its effects. Flowing from these
presumptions, the second part of the solution would involve wresting back control
of both the players and the NBA brand. Curiously, the NBA’s objective was not to
affect the larger social field, replete with its contradictions of racism, unruly
“gangsta” types, and salacious media. Rather, the objective was to distinguish the
NBA brand or corporate entity as an exceptional force in that field.
One White NBA executive explained the problem and the solution this way:
Whether it be a commercial . . . a PSA [public service announcement], [or]
an appearance, that’s not us telling it but it’s the sponsor. Then the media.
We had to make sure they realized what these people were really like. . . .
And so, the challenge is to get people to really know your product as more
than just a basketball player. Know him as a person. . . . I mean, how can you
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sell something without . . . understanding what your product’s really about?
So we try to humanize these people. And I understand what these players are
like, and who they are. And they are good people, OK? (January 25, 2001)
For me, the tone and content of this quote clearly evoke those reassuring business
literature passages about diversity management. If the league’s “humanizing” efforts effectively center the NBA as a heroic, managerial force, that centering succeeds by both catering to and signaling a certain dependency on a general (White)
anxiety over how Black masculinity can be controlled. In this regard, the NBA has
aligned itself with a broad range of disciplinary and punitive mechanisms. On this
point, we might consider again the observations Cheryl Cole and Samantha King
stated in their analysis of Hoop Dreams:
The figure of the basketball player, defined over and against the criminal
(the gang member that governs America’s representation of African-American
men in the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s), also functions as a means of displacement that reconciles middle-class America’s sense of itself as compassionate as it calls for and endorses increasingly vengeful punitive programs.
(1998, p. 78)
The NBA must be read as part of this representational structure, even as it appears
to update it by avoiding race-specific invocations in favor of a more inclusive
“humanity.” Specifically, the NBA’s invocations of the players’ true humanity work
to conceal the will toward control (and profit) that inspires those invocations in the
first place.
Seen in the light of the NBA’s (unacknowledged) dependence on the criminal image in order to stage its own managerial heroism, the fact that some of the
stars have refused to fully accommodate themselves to brand imperatives is not so
much a problem as a recurrent opportunity to present the dramatic tension between management and racialized insubordinates. Consonant with the brand’s image
as benevolent maker of responsible social beings, the NBA seems to have settled
on an approach that includes an internal orientation to the players in order to help
them “grow” as people, as well as a public amplification of the league’s managerial efforts. The brand/company is gentle, a supportive framework for moving and
celebrating the perpetual transition of unproductive, unruly subjects to productive
citizens (Kelley, 1998). This fact also helps to explain, as well, the ways that, as I
discussed earlier, the Black men at NBA corporate rationalize their participation in
the project.
In order to understand the ways that this orientation manifests in the consumable NBA product, we might consider the presentation of NBA coaches, who
are, after all, the embodiment of on-the-court management. According to the
Newsweek piece mentioned earlier, the NBA responded to the “rogue” player problem by investing in management, by turning “to higher-profile, higher-paid coaches
with more clout. The result [was] a culture clash between authoritarian, mostly
white coaches and their brash, young, mostly black talent” (Starr & Samuels, 1997,
p. 28). In response, many of these coaches changed their management styles. Former
Lakers coach Del Harris, for example, reflected on his transformation:
“I used to yell, but I don’t anymore. . . . I learned you have a much better
success rate when you treat the players with respect.” 76ers [and now Pistons]
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coach Larry Brown . . . is trying a different—and gentler—approach too.
(Starr & Samuels, 1997, p. 29)
The NBA also sought to move the relationship between the coach-as-manager
and player-as-product-and-employee more toward the center of its televisual presence. Responding to a 14% ratings drop in 1999, the NBA pushed coaches to allow
microphones and cameras in the locker rooms and sideline discussions during select broadcasts. Although many coaches resisted and resented the prying, the NBA
thought that adding this element of management-in-action to the presentation would
bring back the fans (Sheridan, 2000). Although I have no solid evidence one way
or another about the success of these framings with fans as such, the celebritization
of coaches as managers has had clear resonance outside of basketball circles and
in curiously familiar ways, at that.
Consider Phil Jackson, the epitome of the NBA’s kinder, gentler approach to
coaching and management. Beginning in 1989 with the Chicago Bulls (during the
MJ era) and now with the Los Angeles Lakers (in the Shaquille O’Neal and Kobe
Bryant era), Jackson has won the NBA championship nine times. Known as the
“Zen master” for his selective use of Native American and Buddhist mysticism
and spirituality in his coaching practice, Jackson has become an enigmatic celebrity of broad appeal. In the wake of his NBA successes and two best-selling books,
Jackson’s wisdom has been repeatedly sought by business journals. In a clear parallel with the general literature on diversity management, the business articles suggest that Jackson’s main impediment is the unruliness of his employees’ egos,
which, when managed correctly, are transformed into collective success.15 Consider the following examples, particularly the way they celebrate Jackson’s cultural approach to achieving discipline and focus in his workforce.
• The journal Executive Excellence explains that Jackson’s leadership style
helps “followers to achieve their goals and aspirations. Jackson is an ‘invisible leader’ who, by the example of his own selfless, thoughtful behavior,
helped the Chicago Bulls’ egotistical players ‘embrace a vision in which the
group imperative takes precedence over individual glory’” (O’Toole, 2000,
p. 10).
• In a 1996 headnote, the journal Sales & Marketing Management offered
this: “Wonder how to manage superstars with outsize egos? Just ask NBA
champion Phil Jackson” (Cohen, p. 52).
• In a seeming follow-up to this point, Inc. magazine wanted to know how
Jackson, as a “teacher” and “counselor,” trained his players to avoid the
“abuse of anger” in the interest of team goals and how that translates into the
“handling of key employees” (Welles, 1996, p. 35). In the same article, Phil
Jackson, speaking about a particularly violent playoff game, noted that his
“players reverted to their primitive instinct. To use force” (p. 35).
• Industry Week describes Brian Moskal’s profile of Jackson as uncovering “a
managerial style that uses Native American prayer, Zen Buddhist awareness, and commonsense communication techniques to mold the diverse backgrounds and clashing egos of talented individuals into a selfless, highperformance team” (1996, p. 6).
• Fortune spoke with Jackson about the “art of making even superstars like
Michael Jordan team players” (Lieber, 1995, p. 218).
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I interpret these passages through a lens similar to that of Cheryl Cole and
David Andrews, who have noted that mainstream media representations of Black
NBA players are typically framed in such a way that “those images are never
simply passively seen but are read through a racially inflected discourse that renders visible race through moral and characterological inadequacies” (1996, p. 150).
We could certainly say a lot here about the ways that anxiety over indiscriminate,
selfish, and unproductive Black irreverence is transcoded through sports and
managerialism into seemingly laudable goals such as teamwork and winning. In
Gordon’s terms again, we might begin by noting that managing diversity often
entails the maintenance of “systems that produce racializing effects, often in the
name of some matter more urgent than redressing racial subordination, such as
rewarding ‘merit,’ valuing diversity, or enhancing economic competitiveness”
(Gordon, 1995, p. 17–18). Indeed, for the NBA of the late 1990s through the beginning of this century, concerns about Blackness have appeared mostly through a
set of codes that perpetuate the old dichotomies. The positively valenced
characteristics—that is, the diversity that the NBA celebrates—include “urban,”
politically neutral hip-hop, and coolness. These are counterbalanced by a series of
threats to the inside: indecent rap music; unrestrained tempers—in Jackson’s own
words, “primitive impulses”; and, perhaps most of all, the team-destroying narcissism or egos of stars.
The dominant frame through which Jackson’s managerial expertise is solicited and presented echoes both the internal NBA approach to “product” management and the diversity-management subtext in which racialized subjects in the
business world are a potential threat to productivity, requiring new management
approaches. There are, to be sure, numerous “identificatory possibilities created
through the figure of the [Black] NBA superstar” (Cole & Andrews, 1996, p. 141).
And yet, the language used in business texts to value Jackson’s contributions makes
clear a preferred reading of the NBA spectacle that parallels the way that diversity
management works as a palliative to (White) anxieties about race. In that sense, I
am arguing that management also transcodes Whiteness, making it parenthetical
to, or even disappear into, more transcendent collectivities such as the team, the
brand, or society.
The NBA exemplifies a broader phenomenon in which explicit talk of Blackness as the object of White control can be made to disappear into the language of
management, and this phenomenon has a number of effects. For one, as the celebration of controlled diversity increases and as the equation between Whiteness
and management becomes fainter, the perspective of management appears less
and less biased by race and more and more democratic at its core. The brand, like
society, comes to have a logic that encodes Whiteness although appearing transcendent of race. It follows, therefore, that Black coaches or executives might
echo the Jacksonian sentiment discussed previously. One Black business manager
at the NBA exemplified and illustrated these embedded effects in his description
of how the NBA compassionately addresses player discipline:
[We] give the players a little bit of space to be autonomous, to be their own
person. You know, the league could have come down and said to Allen Iverson
“You can’t do a rap album.” That’s the wrong approach. He can do what he
wants. “It’s not something we like, it’s not good for the brand, it’s not good
for yourself, and I don’t know if that’s how you want to position yourself,
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but at the same time, it’s not illegal; it’s not something you cannot do. And
it’s not popular, it’s not going to be popular among the people you work with
and work for.” And sometimes that’s all the pressure that’s needed for someone to back off and think twice. Next time he probably will do another album and he probably will use profanity, but he might think twice about yelling about women or gays or whatever it might be because he realizes, you
know, “I have to be responsible to someone, and in this case maybe I should
just hold back and do something else.” And I think that’s fair. You know
there’s some organizations that would have just come back and said “You’re
suspended. You can’t do this or you can’t do that.” And that’s not how our
society works. (January 24, 2001)
In the example of the NBA as a project of diversity management, specifically racialized categories of White and Black are subsumed into a larger unity
that attempts to erase antagonism. This is a familiar formula in results-oriented,
competitive institutions (sport, the corporation), especially insofar as one accepts
productivity and winning as unproblematic social values, and where management
is the arbiter of good and bad behavior. Management is “colorblind,” in a sense,
because it assesses individual social value, not by anything so crass and retrograde
as skin color, but by the productivity of actions and attitudes, by an individual’s
ability and willingness to line up behind the brand and its blurred synonymy with
humanity, civilization, and the corporation. It is along these lines that management
continues the history of comforting the unmarked majority through the policing of
“others,” while failing to reflect on—let alone challenge—the larger social and
historical causes of racism from which dominant White interests continue to benefit tacitly.

Conclusion
Management, in all its glorified neutrality, is still what most people believe
protects them from the street, from chaos, from unregulated decision making by the unwashed and the lowly.
–Avery Gordon, “The Work of Corporate Culture,” (1995, p. 21)
Earlier in this article I posed a question about the relationship among management in general, managed cultural representations, and subjectivity. I asked,
what are the relations of ruling that unite a strategy for disciplining racialized
subjects with disciplined representations of race? And this question arose out of a
discussion of business-driven cultural developments, inside and outside of corporations, that have occurred over the past quarter century and, also, in relation to the
changing terms by which subjects in that blurred terrain are called into meaningful
social action. As a case in point, the NBA illustrates how these sorts of strategic
blurrings can work from the inside out to diffuse a reassuring logic of managerialism.
The admittedly partial discussion of the NBA offered here brings into focus
a cluster of articulations—sets of practices “by which [a] particular structure of
relationships” (Grossberg, 1992, p. 397), although malleable, is held on its particular course, or governed, we might say, by the force of management. I have
shown, in particular, how the NBA brand—as an ideological, racialized cultural
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logic, along with its attendant practices—articulates the inside of the corporation
with the popular outside. The scope of this force, however, far exceeds the localized will to insulate itself against chaos shared by those who work in the interest of
(NBA) management. White anxieties about race inside the NBA, to the extent that
they find expression and resolution in the NBA brand, thereby become available
as a logic that can be applied in other anxious registers of social life—that is,
among fans, sponsors, and the general community of managers. The NBA’s racial
project stands as a solution, a disciplined representation that helps to produce our
culture’s current racial formation. My conclusion to this article and my answer to
its central question, therefore, begin with the observation that the NBA is, in many
ways, a management spectacle that continually redefines the potentially unruly
and unproductive Black body as the problem that it perpetually solves. Whiteness,
in the form of managerialism, is the dominant perspective from which these relations of ruling emerge. I want now to elaborate and generalize this observation by
paying particular attention to the sports framework for this specific kind of diffusion of diversity management into everyday life.
In their assessment of how “sport leaks into everyday life,” Toby Miller and
Alec McHoul note, first of all, that sport in modernity
is dedicated to “Merit, Justice, Desire, Will.” For justice has a dialectical
relationship with merit, and will with desire. These are central precepts of
modernity: not merely its individualistic, accumulationist side . . . but also
the more collective side of the modern, with the desiring subject’s wishes
considered alongside the needs of others: the “nice” part of teamwork and
discipline. (1998, p. 83)
In other words, sport mobilizes and occupies a narrative structure that perpetually
remakes itself as a technology for articulating certain modes of individual agency
with disciplined social enterprises. And a particularly consistent theme of this linkage stems from the molding of individual desire into a will toward group victory,
and then mistaking and promoting the result as justice—a theme that the previous
passage’s invocation of teamwork and discipline places firmly in the context of
recent management developments.
As both metaphors about social life and literalizations of it, sports have a
long history as vehicles for representing seemingly disparate social elements as
natural unities. In Miller and McHoul’s words, this capacity of sports hinges on
the fact that “sports are both inside and outside the everyday” (1998, p. 85). The
unique effectiveness of this peculiar double character is tied to the ways that sports
(especially team sports) offer multiple and ambiguous possibilities for group identification and, thus, an ever-handy analogy for managerialist impulses. For example, consider the different implications of a) a basketball player exclaiming,
“We won!” in a postgame celebration; b) a fan, phoning a friend after the same
game, and shouting ecstatically into the phone, “We won! We won!”; and c) someone who knows little of basketball, who nonetheless, after reading in the paper that
the U.S. basketball team won a match over the Iraqi team, thinks to himself, “Oh!
Good, we won!”16 The variable inclusiveness of the “we” in these statements, and
sport’s rather unique cultural capacity for enabling and constraining such identifications, explains, in particular, a great deal about why sports are so popular as
media–marketing vehicles. For example, Jeremy Rifkin (2000) notes
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a growing awareness among management and marketing experts alike that
establishing so-called communities of interest is the most effective way to
capture and hold customer attention and create lifetime relationships. . . .
The key to creating communities of interest is to plan events, gatherings and
other activities that bring customers together to share their common interest
in your company’s brand.
Understood in this light, their signifying properties make sports one of the most
ideal interpellation devices for marketers trying to communicate with groups of
consumers as discrete markets, especially in the age of branding, in which the
notion of “‘corporate citizenship’ links consumption to good civic life by projecting an image of corporations as civil societies unto themselves” (Maharaj, p. 239n).
The corporation and I can constitute a we, as can the corporation, the nation, and
myself, but we can also be myself and the other members of the target market. This
sports-specific flexibility has serious social consequences.
In her examination of the power of Nike’s brand, Celia Lury theorizes that
the device of the brand makes possible new relationships between producers and
consumers, a fact that should direct us toward new kinds of questions, namely,
what types of activity, what kinds of movement, which bodies, are coming
to be seen as fit for this space? . . . What relationships are possible between
the actualization of place in traces and the prescriptions of space in brands?”
(1999, p. 522)
There is, as Lury argues and as the example of the NBA illustrates, a politics to this
we, because every we is constituted by its exclusion of a they. Whereas the NBA
might be an extreme example in our current mediascape, its very prominence also
makes it a broadly resonant cultural force. From its vantage point, the NBA has
honed a representational strategy that exploits a distinction between the we of fan
identifications with teams or players (each with distinct brand identities) and a we
that unites those of us invested in a moral vision of productive citizenship and its
relation to modes of accumulation, winning, and profit.
The mass-mediated NBA brand, no doubt, makes possible myriad we’s as it
is produced, distributed, and consumed across the globe. As evidenced by David
Stern and the NBA employees I interviewed, however, one we that is central, if
somewhat unconscious, to NBA corporate understandings of itself is the we of the
American White imaginary. Consequently, I want to combine a concern about the
relations of NBA players to their productive work with an additional concern about
the relations of viewers and fans to the representations of managed players. In one
respect, humanizing the product, as it were, seems intended to make possible a
(White) postracist identification with deracialized players. In so doing, however,
and much like diversity management more generally, it speaks to and capitalizes
on those aspects of the White imaginary—increasingly under erasure—that see
Blackness as warranting control. As my analysis has shown, the NBA brand seems
designed to make identifications with the management impulse in relation to the
problem possible, perhaps even more so than White identifications with Jordanesque
employees. That is, it solicits an audience gaze that can enjoy the product by identifying with management.
The NBA presents and thinks of itself as a kind of solution to racial discord
and to the problem of Black disenfranchisement in particular. It does so while
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presuming as transcendent the values of winning and profit maximization, and it
thereby fails in recognizing both that it is a producer of race and that its (White)
anxiety is symptomatic of the problem. At a broad level, then, I think the NBA
stands as a disturbing and prominent example of management becoming consumable as popular culture, popularizing, that is, a management perspective in relation
to troublesome, unproductive subjects. In this presentation of managing Black men
as dramatic popular culture, the NBA contributes to a subtle continuation of a
presumed (and reassuring) link between Whiteness and management while conveniently, even strategically, avoiding altogether specific questions about race. By
extension, the NBA example suggests not only that management leaks into everyday life but also that there is a flow back and forth: the corporate outside—here as
cultural representation—exerts an identifiable influence over the experience of
management (difference) inside. Thus, in conjunction with the mystifying discursive terrain of liberated workers and consumers, the bottom line remains taut because, after all and once again, it is management that has been liberated.
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Notes
1

According to trends reported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Black men now
have a 1 in 3 chance of spending time in prison during their lifetimes (Chaddock, 2003).
2
In 2002, 78% of NBA players were African American, followed by the National
Football League with 65%, and Major-League Baseball with 10% (Lapchick, 2003, p. 14).
3
Robin D. G. Kelley (1998) also makes this point.
4
The NBA faced a ratings and revenue slump after the 1998–99 season, largely because of the retirement of Michael Jordan. Nonetheless, as Hoover’s Online (2003) reports
in the lead paragraph of its NBA profile, “the NBA is shaking off its fiscal and image
problems with a little magic from the Washington Wizards, which added superstar Michael
Jordan to its roster after he came out of retirement for the second time in 2001.” Of course,
Jordan retired again after the 2002–03 season.
5
These figures are roughly accurate. In 2000, 75% of the NBA’s professional employees were White and 12% were African American. In 2002, those figures were, respectively, 72% and 17% (Lapchick, 2003, p. 18).
6
These changes in corporate culture are most germane, of course, to the elite Western
professional–managerial classes and to those aspiring to enter them. The global race to the
bottom for cheap labor and resources has meant that the corporate culture revolution and
“Just Do It!” attitude adjustments are only possible because so many people in the world
still toil in industrial squalor or, less fortunate still, have been abandoned completely by the
glistening global economy.
7
This fact helps explain a general explosion of sports programming during the same
period, that ESPN calculated this way: “In 1994, a family with cable TV had access to
21,000 hours of sports programming per year. [In 2000], that same family will have access
to 86,000 hours of sports on TV, or more than 235 hours per day” (James, 2000).
8
“In 1987, the Hudson Institute issued a report entitled Workforce 2000: Work and
Workers for the 21st Century that has since become one of the most cited sources in popular
business literature. Workforce 2000 forecast that, by the year 2000, 85% of the labor force
growth (new entrants) will be comprised of White women and people of color, including
immigrants” (Gordon, 1995, p. 9).
9
In its most cynical versions, diversity management consists of an isolated workshop
or two focused on “tolerating difference”; at its most sincere, diversity management involves a holistic approach to ensuring that all aspects of corporate life are oriented toward a
“valuing” of diversity.
10
M.H. Abrams defines representations as textual
formations which are the ‘ideological products’ or ‘cultural constructs’ of a particular era. . . . These cultural and ideological representations . . . serve mainly to reproduce, confirm, and propagate the power structures of domination and subordination
which characterize a given society. (1993, p. 249)
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Indeed, cultural critics work from the often tacit notion that the politics of textual representation are revealed in their complex relations to realms of social existence in which actual
bodies of persons representing various constituencies struggle to gain or preserve their relative interests.
11
See Cole & Andrews (1996) for a good history of what they call “superstar trouble”
in the NBA.
12
Elsewhere, the Newsweek article (Starr & Samuels, 1997) seems to undermine the
generation hypothesis, admitting that “bad behavior was not invented by Latrell Sprewell,”
who was 27 in 1997. In fact, at 22, Allen Iverson is the only one of the featured, badbehaving players who is truly young. The other players in Newsweek’s “NBA Rogues’ Gallery” are Charles Barkley (34), Derrick Coleman (30), Nick Van Exel (26), Isiah Rider (26),
and Dennis Rodman (36).
13
Theresa Walton (2001) contrasts the sustained media focus on the “public sphere”
Sprewell/Carlesimo episode with the comparatively tolerant disinterest shown toward the
rampant instances of “domestic” violence against women committed by athletes. My argument extends and elaborates Walton’s observations that the Sprewell case garnered exceptional attention not only because it was a specifically “workplace incident,” but also because it dramatized a “threat to (White male) authority” (2001, p. 352).
14
According to Gordon, for example,
diversity management rarely attributes increased rates of White female labor force
participation to the economic crises of the mid-1970s, preferring the more idealistic
explanation of heightened feminist consciousness. It rarely links the presence of a
“rainbow” of Latino and Asian workers, domestic and immigrant, to global politicaleconomic policies and struggles. And, of course, it spends an awful lot of energy,
precisely through its relationship to affirmative action, rejecting the view that middleclass status is a highly politically dependent condition. (1995, p. 16)
15
Davis and Harris identify the following general theme in mid-1990s scholarly literature: “media show sports participation, with the guidance of European-American coaches,
as helping African American athletes to find salvation from themselves and thus from (their
tendency toward) deviance” (1998, p. 166).
16
This discussion (and my eventual appropriation) of sport’s unique capacity to produce such a range of we’s is a paraphrase of Miller and McHoul’s (1998, pp. 85–86) summary of Harvey Sacks’ (1995) work.

